Protect running workloads, APIs, and production applications.
Runtime Agents protect running workloads, containers, APIs, Kubernetes, services, and production applications. They monitor runtime behavior, anomalous execution, dependency risk, privilege misuse, workload drift, and active exploitation.
Request early access →The Ollandi defense loop
Every agent follows the same cycle, producing auditable, coordinated response.
Observe
Ingest domain-specific signals in real time with full telemetry fidelity.
Reason
Correlate local evidence with the shared threat model and adjacent agents.
Validate
Check policy boundaries, blast radius, and consensus before acting.
Act
Execute bounded, reversible actions through approved control interfaces.
Evidence
Record every observation, decision, and action in an auditable bundle.
What it protects
- •Kubernetes clusters and pods
- •Containerized microservices
- •APIs and service meshes
- •Serverless functions
- •Production databases and data paths
What it monitors
- •Container and pod lifecycle events
- •API request and response patterns
- •Runtime process and syscall behavior
- •Workload configuration and image drift
- •Dependency and supply-chain events
What it detects
- •Container escape and privilege misuse
- •API abuse and unauthorized data access
- •Runtime exploitation and RCE
- •Workload drift from approved image
- •Supply-chain and dependency attacks
What it can do
- •Restart or isolate compromised workloads
- •Block malicious API calls at the gateway
- •Enforce approved image and policy baseline
- •Correlate with Cloud and Endpoint agents
- •Capture runtime trace and evidence bundle
What evidence it generates
- •Container and pod state timeline
- •API call trace with request context
- •Runtime behavior baseline deviation
- •Image drift and policy violation record
- •Cross-agent incident narrative
One working agent experience
See how an runtime agent moves through the defense loop on a real incident.
Observe
Pod auth-service-7c9a4 spawned a shell and attempted to access the secrets store.
Reason
No legitimate reason for runtime shell; secrets access outside service role.
Validate
Cloud Agent confirms no deployment event; Identity Agent flags service account misuse.
Act
Terminate pod, rotate affected secrets, alert team.
Evidence
Pod event timeline, secrets access log, and remediation steps recorded.
Part of a coordinated defense
Runtime Agents close the loop between cloud control planes and endpoint behavior, protecting the layer where applications actually execute.